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PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF ISSUER

1.

Was Mr. Arroyo's ''consent" voluntarily given and not the

result of duress or coercion, express or implied?
2.

Did the trial judge reach the issue of the voluntariness

of the Mr- Arroyo's "consent" to search hi$ truck?
3.

Even assuming that Mr. Arroyo voluntarily consented to

the search of his truck, did the State sustain its burden of
establishing a break in the causal connection between the illegal
pretext stop and the evidence subsequently obtained from Mr.
Arroyo?

STATEMENT OF THE CA$E

This is a Petition for Rehearing of a decision filed by this
Court on February 15, 1989.

Originally th£ State of Utah filed

an Interlocutory Appeal challenging the District Court's
suppression of cocaine seized after a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper
stopped Jose Francisco Arroyo for an alleged traffic offense.
The trial court found the stop of Mr. Arroyo's vehicle to be a
pretext stop which violated Mr. Arroyo's Fcburth Amendment
Rights.

This court reversed that decision.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent relies upon the Findings of Fact entered by
Judge Ray M. Harding (a copy of which is included with the
Appellant's brief) and agrees with the facts set forth in the
Court's opinion denominated as such under the heading of
"Facts"•

However, the Respondent disputes this Court's assertion

that Mr. Arroyo, through his counsel stipulated that he had
consented to the search of his vehicle.

Respondent's counsel

entered into no such stipulation concerning either the consent or
the voluntariness of Mr. Arroyo's consent.

ARGUMENT

Respondent's counsel never stipulated that Arroyo had
consented to the search of his vehicle.

The trial court and

Respondent's counsel, not having the benefit of this Court's
ruling in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
both misunderstood the law on attenuation of taint, and as a
result, neither the issue of consent or the issue of attenuation
of the taint were ever considered by the trial court.

The record

is incomplete on these issues and a remand to the trial court for
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law is warranted.
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INTRODUCTION
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of Court of Appeals.

In Brown v. Pickard, denying

Reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established
the standard for granting a Petition for Rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be made.
We must be convinced that the Court failed to consider
some material point in the case, or that it erred in
its conclusions . . . .
11 P. at 512
Later, in Cummings v. Nielson 129 P. 619 (1913), this court
added:
To make an application for rehearing is a matter of
right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing Petitions for Rehearings in proper
cases. When this Court, however, has considered and
decided all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, unless we
have misconstrued, or overlooked some statute or
decision which may affect the result, or that we have
based the decision on some wroncy principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially effects the result .i. . . If there are
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated
above, or other good reasons, a Petition for a
Rehearing should be properly fiied, and if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be scrutinized
by this Court.
Id at 624.
The argument section of this brief will establish that, applying
these standards, this Petition for Rehearing is properly before
the Court and should be granted.

In its opinion in State v.

Arroyo, Utah Court of Appeals Case No.
February 15, 1989),

88Q062-CA, (filed

this Court committedrtianifesterror in that

the decision to reverse the trial court (a^ distinguished from
-3-

remanding the matter), was based upon the erroneous assumption
that the Respondent's counsel stipulated that Mr. Arroyo had
consented to the search of his vehicle and that Respondent's
counsel then sought to take advantage of the State and the Court
by objection to an inquiry into the circumstances of the
"consent" search.

Additionally, this Court overlooked applicable

law on the attenuation of the Wong Sun taint issue.

ARGUMENT
Point 1
RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL NEVER STIPULATED THAT MR. ARROYO HAD
EITHER CONSENTED OR VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF
HIS VEHICLE.
In reversing the trial court's decision suppressing the
evidence seized from Mr. Arroyo's truck, this Court first
concluded that Respondent's counsel had stipulated that Mr.
Arroyo had consented to the search of his vehicle.
counsel did not enter into any such stipulation.

Respondent's
Additionally,

because this Court concluded that Respondent's counsel had
mislead both the State and the Court, this Court apparently
concluded that an appropriate sanction for counsel's misconduct
was to find facts which were never considered by the trial
court.

Accordingly, this Court found the fact and made the

conclusion of law that the consent was voluntarily given.

With

all due respect to this Court, this conclusion and the decision
to reverse the trial court's suppression order are unwarranted
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and unsupported by the record since Respondent's counsel entered
into no such stipulation.
It is true that Respondent's counsel erroneously challenged
only the propriety of Mr. Arroyo's initial stop.
issues of the

The additional

1) voluntariness of Mr. Arroyo's consent and

2)

the question of whether the government could establish a break in
the causal connection between the pretext stop and the evidence
obtained from the "consent" should also have been addressed at
the suppression hearing.
regard was just that.

However, counsel's oversight in this

No malice or devious intent was conjured

up by Respondent's counsel.

Instead, Respondent's counsel

incorrectly believed that the trial court'^ inquiry ended with
the determination of whether Trooper Mange^son's stop of Mr.
Arroyo was unconstitutional.

Although State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d

972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), has instructed counsel and the court
that a search conducted pursuant to a voluntary consent purges
the taint from a prior illegal stop, that case was not decided
until after the suppression hearing held ih the lower court.
This Court misapprehended the facts when it concluded that
Respondent's counsel had entered into a stipulation that Mr.
Arroyo had consented to the search of his vehicle.

When the

State's counsel endeavored to probe the question of whether Mr.
Arroyo's "consent" was voluntary, Respondent's counsel objected
on the basis that the only relevant issue was whether the
original stop was a pretext stop.
sustained the objection.

The tri&l court agreed and

However, Respondent's counsel did not

-5-

at that time, or at any other time, stipulate that Mr. Arroyo had
consented to the search of the vehicle.

In fact, the only

representation made in that regard was made by the State's
counsel, and not the Respondent's counsel.

The colloquy was as

follows:
Trooper Mangelson: I approached the vehicle. I asked for a
driver's license. I made as many observations about the
vehicle as I could.
Question (Don Eyre, Juab County Attorney):
you observed. Answer: I observed . . .

Describe what

Mr. Bugden: Your Honor, for the record, I think 1 would
object to any further inquiry at this point. My motion only
goes to the propriety and the lawfulness of the stop. And I
think that is what . . .
The Court:
Mr. Eyre:

Was this a consent search?
Yes, sir.

The Court: I think that is true, counsel. It goes strictly
to the stop.
Mr. Eyre: O.k.
Question: Anything else about the stop
that you recall that you have not previously testified to?
Answer: I don't believe so.
Page 40, transcript of Suppression Hearing.
Thus, the record itself clearly discloses that it was Mr.
Eyre, the Juab County Attorney, who asserted to the Court that
the search was a consent search.

Mr. Eyre has stipulated in an

affidavit attached hereto as Appendix I that Respondent's counsel
did not stipulate that Arroyo had voluntarily consented to the
search.
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Point II
THE TRIAL JUDGE NEVER REACHED THE CONSENT ISSUE.
Both the Respondent's counsel and the trial judge
erroneously believed that evidence which would not have been
discovered "but for" the prior illegal stop was per se
inadmissible.

Because the Respondent's counsel and the trial

court were wrong in this regard, the trial court never reached
the consent issue.

Absolutely no facts weire presented in

connection with the consent issue.
This Court apparently placed special significance on the
trial court's Finding of Fact 18.

That Finding of Fact states,

"The trooper requested permission to search the Defendant's
vehicle, and the Defendant consented to the search of the
vehicle."

Based on this Finding of Fact, this Court stated, "the

trial judge specifically found that Arroyo consented to the
search of his truck, and there was nothing in the record to
contradict this finding."

By this statement, this Court seems to

have concluded that the trial court considered the consent search
issue.

It did not.

Respondent submits th&t the trial court

found nothing more in Finding of Fact 18 than that Trooper
Mangelson requested permission to search Mr. Arroyo's truck and
Mr. Arroyo agreed or consented.

Thus, the trial court entered no

conclusion of law concerning either consent or the voluntariness
of said consent.
The case at bar is not unlike Sierra.

In Sierra, this Court

remanded the matter for the trial court to make sufficient
-7-

findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issues of whether
1) Sierra's consent was voluntary and 2) whether the evidence was
procured by exploitation of the primary illegality or instead v/as
obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the initial
illegal stop. In Sierra,, this Court concluded a remand was in
order because so many factual issues were unresolved and
undeveloped in the record.

In the instant matter these same

deficiencies in the record exist.

The Respondent submits that

just as in Sierra this case should be remanded to the trial court
for a further determination of both the voluntary consent and
attenuation of taint issues.
Point III
EVEN IF IT IS IGNORED THAT THERE WAS NO STIPULATION AS TO
CONSENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT OF
VOLUNTARY CONSENT, THE STATE IS STILL NOT ENTITLED TO A
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT f S SUPPRESSION ORDER BECAUSE THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED A BREAK IN THE
CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ILLEGAL PRETEXT STOP AND THE
EVIDENCE SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED WAS NEVER CONSIDERED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.
Even it is assumed contrary to the record that the trial
court did consider the consent issue, the admissibility of the
challenged evidence cannot be correctly decided unless the trial
court found from the evidence a break in the chain of illegality
and that a finding was made that Mr. Arroyo's "consent" was his
free and voluntary act.

For the reasons already stated, this

issue was never reached by the trial court.
In Respondent's brief, Mr. Arroyo cited numerous decisions
where a finding of consent failed to establish a break in the
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chain of illegality.

Those decisions were not discussed at

length in Respondent's brief.

However, because this Court ruled

"that although the original illegal stop was unconstitutional,
Arroyo's subsequent voluntary consent purged the taint from the
initial illegality . . .", Respondent believes it may be
pertinent to point out that in many cases $. finding of voluntary
consent was inadequate to purge the primary illegality of the
Wong Sun taint.
In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (19$2), a suspect's
consent to search his two suitcases was tainted by his illegal
detention and was ineffective to justify the search of his twosuit cases.

Royer was approached at an aifport by detectives who

asked for his airline ticket and driver's license.

Without

returning the ticket and license the detectives asked Royer to
accompany them to a small room.

After obtaining Royerfs luggage

from the airline without his consent, he then produced a key and
unlocked one suitcase.

Drugs were found in that suitcase.

Royer

then indicated to the detectives that he did not know the
combination to the lock of the second suitcase.

When asked if he

objected to the detective opening the suitcase, Royer said, "no,
go ahead," and did not object when the detective further
explained the suitcase might have to be pried open.
court concluded that Royer's
and voluntarily given".

The trial

consent to the search was "freely

The Florida District Court of Appeal

held, inter alia, that "at the time his consent to search was
obtained, he was unlawfully confined and consent to search was

-9-

therefore invalid because tainted by the unlawful confinement."
460 U.S. at 495.

The Florida Court of Appeals held that because

there was no proof in a "break in a chain of illegality" the
consent was invalid as a matter of law.

In affirming the

suppression order, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Because we affirm the Florida District Court of
Appeals' conclusion that Royer was being illegally
detained when he consented to the search of his
luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by the
illegality . . .
Id at 507.
The Respondent submits that the same reasoning applies in the
instant matter.

Once the conclusion is reached that the

Respondent was unlawfully stopped, and therefore unlawfully
detained by Trooper Mangelson, then the State in the instant
matter has the same burden that the State in Florida v. Royer was
unable to sustain.
In United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1981), an
informant contacted the DEA and provided information that a
person was selling heroin from a particular motel room.

The

informant furnished the DEA with a description of the
individual.

The DEA contacted the motel clerk and confirmed

that the defendant matched the description provided by the
informant.

The clerk advised the DEA that the defendant was

expecting a package.
contacted the DEA.

When the package arrived, the motel clerk
The package had been damaged, and when the

DEA agent was handling the package, it broke open and a bindle
fell out.

The bindle tested positive for heroin.
-10-

Additionally,

a trained dog altered on the package.

A search warrant was then

obtained and most of the contents of the package were seized.
However, the defendant was permitted to picpk up the package with
some of its contents still intact.

As soon as the defendant took

possession of the package he was arrested.

Permission was then

requested to search his vehicle and a room in a different motel.
The defendant executed written consent forms.
both locations.

Opium was found in

On appeal, the issue presented was whether the

defendant's post-arrest consent was a sufficiently independent
act to avoid the exclusion of the opium.

The Ninth Circuit

concluded that even assuming the consent was voluntary, "the
evidence must nonetheless be suppressed if the unconstitutional
conduct was not sufficiently attenuated frdpm the subsequent
seizure to avoid exclusion of the evidence . . . "

The Respondent

submits that the same should hold true in the instant matter.
Even assuming a voluntary consent, the government must still
establish that the consent sufficiently attenuated the taint from
the prior unlawful pretext stop.

In Taheyi the government was

unable to carry its burden:
The government, which bears the burden
admissibility in these circumstances .
no intervening events or lapse Of time
show Taherifs consent was sufficiently
will to purge the primary taint of the
invasion.

of showing
. . points to
which would
an act of free
unlawful

Id at 601.
For that reason, the Ninth Circuit held that the opium was inadmissible.
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Similarly in United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir.
1982), the Court stated, "we hold, as a matter of law on the
undisputed facts of the record, that Gooding's illegal seizure
tainted all that ensued in the investigative encounter, and that
his consent to the initial search, even if voluntary, did not
vitiate the taint."
evidence.

Id at 84.

The Gooding court suppressed the

The Court held as follows:
The connection between the illegal seizure and the
consent—all occurring within the same brief,
continuous encounter—was not sufficiently attenuated
to remove the former's taint from the ultimate fruits
of a search.
Id at 84.

In United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985),
the Court focused upon the question of whether the consent to
search was valid despite the unlawful seizure and detention of
the Defendant.

In Recalde, the District Court held that the

consent was knowing and voluntary.

In the instant matter, there

was no such finding.
By focusing only on the voluntariness of the Defendant's
consent and by not considering whether he had been unlawfully
seized, the Recalde court concluded that the District Court had
misapplied the Supreme Court decisions governing the issues.
at 1457.

Id

"The Court therefore did not make its finding in light

of the requirement that such consent be free from the taint of .
the illegal detention.

Because of this, and because of the

illegal nature of RecaldeTs seizure and detention are critical,
we conclude that the District Court's finding of consent is
-12-

clearly erroneous."

Id at 1458.

Thus, notwithstanding that

Recalde executed a written consent form, the Court, held that the
consent was tainted by his prior illegal arrest and detention.
The Respondent submits that the same conclusion will be borne out
by the evidence in the instant matter.
Finally, in State v. Mitchell, 360 So.2d 189 (La. 1978), the
Louisiana Court was confronted with the same issue of assuming
the post-arrest consent after an illegal arrest, was the consent
a product of free will rather than exploitation of the prior
illegal arrest.

In deciding this issue, the Court held, "we

think that the uncontradicted evidence clearly shows that the
defendant's "consent" for the officers to search his residence
was coerced through their exploitation of the immediately
preceding illegal arrest and unconstitutional search of his
vehicle.

Id at 191.

The Respondent submits that all of these cases support the
proposition that even assuming a voluntary consent, a
determination must still be made whether the consent was a
product of the prior illegal stop.

In the instant matter, for

the reasons already stated, no such determination was ever made
by the trial court.
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Arroyo respectfully requests
that this Petition for Rehearing be granted and that the matter
be ultimately remanded to the trial court for a Sierra hearing on
the consent and attenuation issues.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Arroyo, by and through
counsel, respectfully requests that this Petition for Rehearing
be granted.

Counsel for Mr. Arroyo certifies that this Petition

is presented in good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March, 1989.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATION

I, WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., do hereby certify the following:
1.

I am the attorney for Respondent-Petitioner in this

2.

This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court

case;

in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March, 1989.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.,
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, first class
postage prepaid, this

day of March, 1989 to:

Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Sandra Sjogren
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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APPENDIX
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I

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi. Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaint ift-AppelIant,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J,
EYRE JR., JUAB COUNTY
ATTORNEY
Case Nb. 880062-CA

JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO,
Defendant-Respondent.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF JUAB

)

Donald J. Eyre Jr., Juab County Attorney, being first
auiy sworn, and having reviewed the transcript of the
suppression hearing held in the above-entitled matter on
December 8, 1987, and oeing fully advised concerning the
racts in this matter and at the request of counsel for the
defendant to clarify certain matters states as follows:

Page i

1.

I am the Juab County Attorney, and I represented

the State of Utah at the suppression hearing held in this
matter on December 8, 1987.
2.

During my examination of Trooper Mangel son at tne

suppression hearing, counsel for the Defenaant interposed an
objection when I began to develop the facts surrounding tne
Defendant's consent to search his vehicle*
3.

The Court sustained the objection, and I terminated

that tine of inquiry on the basis of tne Court's ruling.
<i.

At the time of the suppression nearing defendant's

counsel, Walter F. Bugden, did not stipulate that the
defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of his
vehicle•
5.

Counsel for the defendant did in the Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order prepared oy him, wherein
the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Suppress, have the
Court make a specific finding that the Defendant consented
to a search of his vehicle.
Dated this

Z /

day of
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/- ^ •

, 1989.

r>
Donald J . ^yfe / 3 f l - " * " "
Juab C o u n t y / A t t o r n e y
u o s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me thi&

\cZeXUMJZJJU

.

Jl /&7L

day of

1989.

Notary Puol ic > ^.Sxate of utan
R e s i a e n c e : Ifieph 1 , Utah
My Commission E x p i r e s :
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